County
Criminal Court:
CRIMINAL LAW- trial may continue where defendant voluntarily absents himself
after the start of a trial-neither the rules nor case law require the State to
prove, or the court to find, that such absence is voluntary before proceeding
with the trial. While state may have improperly gone beyond the evidence to
argue that the defendant suborned perjury, no fundamental error in light of the entire
record. Order of the trial court affirmed. Weber
v. State, No. CRC 07-05619CFAWS (Fla. 6th Cir. App.
Ct. January 22, 2009).
NOT FINAL
UNTIL TIME EXPIRES FOR REHEARING
AND, IF
FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN
AND FOR PASCO COUNTY
JESSICA
CATHERINE WEBER Appeal
No. 07-05619CFAWS
Appellant UCN: 512007005619A000WS
Lower
Case No. 07-03997MMAWS
vs
STATE
OF FLORIDA
Appellee
_____________________________/
Opinion Filed ______________
Appeal
from Pasco County Court
Honorable
Marc Salton
Thomas
Matthew McLaughlin, Esquire
Attorney
for Appellant
Sean
T Donovan, Esquire
Attorney
for Appellee
ORDER AND
OPINION
This
case comes before the court on an appeal from a Final Judgment, after a jury
trial, adjudicating Appellant guilty of Obstructing or Resisting an Officer
Without Violence. The appeal raises two
issues.
Issue One
Whether
the trial court erred by going forward with the trial even though the appellant
was not present.
During a recess of the trial, immediately before closing
arguments, a bomb threat caused the courthouse to be cleared. The recess ended at 1:00 but the building
remained cleared until 2:30. The court
reconvened at 2:45 with everyone present except the defendant. The court allowed counsel time to try to
locate his client, ordered the halls sounded, and inquired to be sure that no
one was being prevented from getting back into the building. The court then continued with the trial,
giving each side 20 minutes for closing arguments. After the court had finished instructing the
jury, the defendant returned to the courtroom saying she had been unable to
find a parking space.
In support of its argument the appellee cites only
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.189, Jarrett v. State, 654 So.2d
973(Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Daniels v. State, 587 So.2d
460(Fla. 1991). Based upon these, the
appellee apparently argues that the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine that the absence of the defendant was not voluntary and would further
argue that the circumstances under which the defendant claims to have failed to
appear in this case would not be a voluntary absence. The court holds that neither the law nor
logic supports either position. Under
Rule 3.180(c) the trial of a defendant, who voluntarily absents himself after
the start of a trial, may continue without him. Neither the rule, nor the cases, require the
State to prove or the court to find that such absence is voluntary before
proceeding with the trial. Even if the defendant’s
representation that she was unable to find a parking place is taken as true, we
hold that this is not such a circumstance as to make her absence anything other
than voluntary.
Issue Two
Whether
the prosecutor’s improper comments denied the appellant a fair trial.
During the course of the closing argument the prosecutor
made the following statements:
“You have to weigh the credibility. First of all, we have law enforcement
officers who were out there on the streets doing routine patrols, just doing
their job. There’s no evidence that they
had any vendettas, that they had anything against the defendant in this case. They were just out there doing their job like
they do every day, day in and day out.”
“In order for you to find the defendant not guilty, you
have to believe that Patrolman Kirkpatrick and Officer Nohejl got together and
made up this story. Folks, that’s just
not reasonable.”
“…” [t]his defendant and her two friends who were in the
car with her got together and made up a story placing the blame on patrolman
Kirkpatrick so she could get out of trouble.”
As appellee admits there was never a timely objection to
any of these statements, and consequently, only fundamental error will sustain
a reversal. Although, clearly the final
remark quoted above is improper argument going beyond the evidence to argue
that the defendant suborned perjury {Cooper v. State, 712 So.2d 1216(Fla. 2d
DCA), rev denied, 720 So.2d 518(Fla.
1998)} we cannot find that it reaches the level of fundamental error. Looking to the entire record it does not
appear that the prosecutorial argument was of such character that its influence
impairs the calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits
of the case by the jury (see Caraballo
v. State, 762 So.2d 542(Fla. 5rth DCA 2000).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment and sentence of
the trial court is affirmed.
Done and Ordered at New Port Richey, Pasco County
Florida, this 21st day of January, 2009.
/s/_________________________________ W.
Lowell Bray, Jr., Circuit Judge
Appellate
Division
/s/_________________________________
Daniel
D. Diskey, Circuit Judge
Appellate
Division
/s/_________________________________ Stanley R. Mills, Circuit Judge
Appellate
Division
Copies
forwarded to:
Thomas
Matthew McLaughlin, Esq.
Sean
T. Donovan, Esq.